MULTI-DIMENSIONAL THREAT PERCEPTION: UNDERSTANDING STATE RESPONSES TO COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

Guo Zhaowen

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
vermouthkuo@gmail.com

Abstract

The resignation of Suharto in 1998 was accompanied with locally concentrated communal violence. This study seeks to understand the variation of state responses to communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia. I argue that threat perception, divided to threat formation and threat evolution, is explanatory in bridging communal violence and state responses.By vertical comparison, I argue that (1) State responses to the outbreak of communal violence depend on threat formation on collective action at societal level; and (2) State responses to the escalation of communal violence depend on threat evolution on collective action at state level. By horizontal comparison, I argue that threat perception of religious violence is stronger than that of ethnic violence.

Keywords

Communal Violence, Threat Perception, State Responses, Collective Action, Indonesia

1. Introduction

The resignation of Suharto in 1998 was accompanied by an upsurge of communal violence in Indonesia (see Figure 1). Patterns of communal violence are identified with scale, level and conflicting cleavages (Varshney et. al. 2004). In the spectrum of level of communal violence characterized by the death toll, large-scale communal violence spans provinces ofWest Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi, andsmall-scale communal violence is marked by anti-migrant violence in Lampung Province . Conflicting groups are mainly identified with cleavages of ethnicity, religion and indigenous-migrant status.

I seek to examine how to understand the variation of state responses to communal violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia. In responses to the spectrum of communal violence, the reason why certain actors were involved and why specific strategies were employed requires understanding dynamically.

Conflict literature on communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia, mainly interest-oriented and institution-oriented, fails to explain the mismatch of upsurge of communal violence and occurrence of critical juncture. State-centric literature on state responses to communal violence, at both state and local level, also requires discussion on dynamic interactions of state-society relationship with temporal and spatial variation. Therefore, a robust theoretical framework which could help resolve the literature gaps is welcomed.

I will employ idea-oriented approach, combined with comparative historical analysis. Idea-oriented approach enjoys two strengths in analysis of communal violence and state responses. First, it identifies a significant division of threats and threats perception. The latter, concerned more in idea-oriented approach, matters in explanation for particularity of state responses in temporal and spatial lines. Second, it performs an important differentiation in state responses, involving the intention to respond and the capacity to respond. The intentional response accounts more for the mismatch of upsurge of communal violence and occurrence of critical juncture.

The dependent variable is state responses. I will examine the actors involved and the strategies employed with temporal and spatial variation. The independent variable is communal violence with discussion at both state and societal level. At societal level, the outbreak of communal violence is examined through demands of conflicting groups and level of organizational institutionalization. At state level, the escalation of communal violence is

inspected through the likelihood of external intervention. Threat perception, serving as anintermediate variable, is divided into threat formation concerning the outbreak of communal violence and threat evolution regarding the escalation of communal violence, with consideration of collective action at societal level and state level respectively.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I will perform a literature review and identify the gaps. Second, I will conduct the research design, covering methodology,conceptualization and theoretical framework. Third, I will employ inter-case and intra-case comparison to examine the mechanisms of theoretical framework. Finally, I will conclude the findings, propose the implications and identify required future work

2. Literature Review

Scholars have offered plenty of potential explanations of the upsurge of communal violence after authoritarian breakdowns. On the one hand, interest-oriented perspective regards the authoritarian breakdown as a "critical juncture" (Bertrand, 2004) with more openness to political opportunity and redistribution of political and economic stakes. Horowitz specifically examines ethnic violence with emphasis of impacts of the economic shock in expansion of intercommunity grievances (Horowitz, 1985), and observable parameters are identified as unemployment and inequitable development (Barron & Madden, 2003). In the context of Southeast Asia, the 1997 Asian financial crisis is attributed to the upsurge of communal violence especially concerning anti-ethnic Chinese violence due to amplification of wealth disparity (Tadjoeddin, etal., 2001b)According to Figure 1(Varshney et al., 2004), however,

|	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Deaths	10	25	7	25	14	23	51	1,059	1,442	3,546	2,585	1,615	245	111
Incidents	30	46	62	60	63	79	123	244	432	523	722	523	406	295

Figure 1: *Deaths and Incidents of collective violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)*

economic shock analysis fails to account for the mismatch of the outbreak of financial crisis in 1997 and the explosion of communal violence in 1996.

Political stakes are welcomed by the 1999 national election. Wilkinson positions himself at state level with analysis of electoral politics, bridging vote occupation of Muslim and level of communal violence (Wilkinson, 2005), while Syndertakes incentives into consideration suggesting that active engagement and bargaining in ethnic groups accounts for the occurrence of communal violence (Synder, 2000). Despite more openness to communal groups, the liberalization of elites to struggle for leadership is addressed. Varshney argues that local elites seek interethnic associational coalition in containment of communal violence (Varshney, 2001). Decentralization, analogously, contributes to intensification of communal violence. With state resources flowing into the local level, mass violence was mobilized because of the combination of weak state responses and dynamics of identification construction (Klinken, 2007). The scope of this analysis on the basis of political stakes, however, is also constrained.

First, this explanation fails to understand the temporal discrepancy because the openness of political stakes emerges in 1999. Second, even if the informational uncertainty is introduced through the noncommittal anticipation of the regime, the analysis is also not robust because both communal and national elites had waited in line for external intervention, which might lead to political transformation and interest reshuffle (Schwarz, 1994).

On the other hand, institution-oriented perspective attributes the communal violence to the weakened coercive capacity without stabilization of social expectations. First, the inadequacy of institutional establishment which serves as security supervisor is to blame. The breakdown of authoritarian regime was accompanied with significant decline in provision of security goods, which might facilitate the security dilemma between identified groups because of greater uncertainty. Groups would be more intentional to mutually arm themselves in pursuit of more credibility of security (Posen, 1993). The strategies of group members, however, have been inadequately considered. In place of armament, nonparticipation and evasion are available. The Posh religious violence in 2000 between Muslims and Christians serves as a cogent counter-case. Ethnic Chinese ensconced themselves in the major town without participating in the violence even in the apex of violence (Tajima, 2008). More technically, the neighboringPal City separated itself from direct intervention but indirect engagement withsupplement of paramilitary police force. Second, the status of violence drives people to reconsider the institutions which are used

for legitimate political expression. Tajima provides a plausible explanation of mismatches of how the state will respond to threats of communal violence between expectations and reality (Tajima, 2014), which mirrors the typological analysis of strength of institution to threats in authoritarian politics and democratic transition (Schedler, 2013). The institutional analysis has significant explanatory power in understanding institutional uncertainty and escalating violence in the context of loosening state capacity. The management of threats and the management of threat perception, however, significantly differ in state responses involving participants, strategies and speed. What institutional analysis has accommodated is exclusively the response to the variation of threats.

Therefore, it is worthwhile to take idea-oriented perspective into consideration. Existing literature on state responses to the variation of violence have been embraced with relevant cultural norms, marked by communism, nationalism and Islam. Boudreau identified Indonesia's distinctive threat perception of communism in comparative analysis with Philippines and Burma/Myanmar. From his analysis, Indonesia was relatively tolerant of urban rumblings but seemed to view rural unrest as particularly serious, while in Burma the rural opposition was largely allowed to political arena (Boudreau, 2009). Anderson regarded nationalism as a majority-minority term at both state level and local level (Anderson, 1983). The resignation of Suharto was accompanied with decline of economic nationalism at state level because of desultory industrial policies, while political nationalism at local level aggrandized seeking for distribution reshuffle. In this sense, the state responses to the variation of violence depend on the power balance in majority-minority line. Indonesia, a country with large Islamic population and loosely governed regions, the impacts of Islam cannot be overlooked either. According to Robert Hefner, state patronage was required in upholding societal commitment by civil Islam entrenched in civic associations. Therefore, the variation of state responses can be attributed to the extent of intimacy between civil Islam and state apparatus (Hefner, 2005).

Without doubt, cultural norms constitute an important part of threat perception at state level. Nevertheless, some significant questions still remain to be answered. First, why some places with relevant cultural norms are accompanied with violence while others not? Second, given the fact that cultural norm is a stable contextual variable, how do we understand the certain timing for state responses dynamically? What other factors will the states take into account besides cultural norms on threat perception?

Therefore, the exploration of causal mechanisms between multi-dimensional threat perception and state responses requires discussion. Threat perception, a concept originally rooted in social psychology, has been widely analyzed in Political Science literature. When treated as an independent variable, the focus lies in the perception and misperception of political leaders which serves as the causes of war (Jervis, 1976). The strength of threat perception is associated with military capacities (Walt, 1985). With further case studies in Latin America (Pion-Berlin, 1988) and in US (Fordham, 1998), however, scholars identifies two-fold state responses, comprised of the response of intention and the response of capacity. Threat perception relies heavily on the former and has been found to have significant effects on public attitudes, tolerance of dissent, and support for political leaders (Pyszcznski et al., 2003).

Threat perception, serving as dependent variable, has also had copious investigation in state-society relationship. In terms of state, the regime type and ideological prism serve as independent variables in macro-level (Farnham, 2oo3). Democratic regimes are believed to have less sensitive threat perception and state responses are more likely to be nonviolent. At the micro-level, the violation of political rulers is presented (Cohen, 1979). The elite cleavage could block the decision-making process for affirmation of state responses. Discussion concentrates more on societal level. Davenport has identifies four main impetuses for threat perception, including basic frequency of violence, contextual presence of violence, variety of strategies employed by dissents, and conventional cultural norms (Davenport, 1995). Following which, scholars conduct further research in their respective field. The studies concerning frequency of violence have aroused the most intensified attention because of the clear measurement (Poeand Tate, 1999). In terms of contextual variables, Goodwin analyzes the relationship between the union of gender, benevolence values and normative influences and terrorist violence (R Goodwin et.cl, 2005). Syrian refugee issue is discussed in cleavages of region, religion, urban/rural and gender in explanation of mechanisms between threat perception and subsequent actions (Wannis, 2014).

Several defects of literature on threat perception should be emphasized. First, the absence of temporal variation requires examination, which will facilitate understanding on dynamics of state responses. Second, threat perception is supposed to be applied to the spectrum of distinctive

concerns. Third, the other factors as well as mostly-discussed cultural norms which influence threat perception requires a general typology based on clearer criterions.

The first literature gap could be partly resolved in this study through the differentiation of threat formation and threat evolution, paralleled with the dynamics of communal violence marked by outbreaks and escalation. Both of the last two defects are expected to be ameliorated through discussion of concerns of threat perception at both societal and state level.

3. Research Design

3.1 Methodology

The research question is how post-Suharto governments responded to the variation of communal violence. The selected time period is from 1999 to 2004 which involves the rise and decline of communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia. I will select three sets of cases: ethnic cases (Central Kalimantan, &West Kalimantan) and religious cases (Ambon, Poso) which are communal violence, and separatist cases (Aceh, Papua). The three sets of cases represent the variation of communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia and cover comprehensive range of state responses. Another key cleavage, indigenous/migrant status, is also found in both ethnic cases and religious cases. In this sense, the interference of indigenous/migrant status can be excluded in comparison of ethnic cases and religious cases. In addition, the inclusion of separatist cases helps confine the scope of the explanation. Separatist movements are long-standing which have thwarted the authoritarian breakdown. Therefore, the temporal analysis of separatist cases, observing state responses and threat perception, can help us to examine the validity of explanatory mechanisms between communal violence and state responses. Given there is no causal connection between communal violence and separatist violence, the examination of mechanism in both sets of cases will not be mutually affected.

I will employ comparative historical analysis through inter-case comparison and intra-case comparison. On the one hand, intra-case comparison will produce more cases to observe and control potential factors associated with ethnic or religious context, which helps clarify the explanation. On the other, inter-case comparison is to explore the key explanatory variable to variation of state responses and also to confine the scope of the explanation.

3.2 Conceptualization

Communal violence is a form of violence that is perpetuated across different ethnic

origins or religious faith at non-state level, serving as the independent variable.It is observed through the outbreak and the escalation. In terms of the outbreak,the indicators are (1) Demands of conflicting groups and (2) Level of group institutionalization, comprising of frame integration and organizational mobilization. In terms of the escalation, the indicator is the likelihood of external intervention, including economic support and security support.

The dependent variable is state response. The indicators are (1) Actors involved and (2) Strategies employed. The actors who formulated the "state responses" contain the executive/president, parliament, or the ministers who handled defense (mainly police and military). The strategies vary from coercive policies like military operations to less coercive policies like victim assistance, official announcement or peace agreement.

Threat perception, the intermediate variable, is under examination of threat formation and threat evolution which parallel dynamics of communal violence. The level of threat perception will be inspected through the following parameters. The first is (1) Threat formation, I will identify the plausible options of state in certain context and compare state responses de facto with others. The exploration of the comparison, sustained by literature, will move us closer to the level of threat perception. The second is (2) Threat evolution, I will compare the speed of the escalation/de-escalation of state responses. If the speed is swifter, the threat perception of the escalation of violence will be stronger.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

Figure 2: *Summary of theoretical framework*

Concerning the outbreak of communal violence, what state concerns more about communal violence is collective action at societal level. Regarded as main indicators, demands of conflicting groups and level of organizational institutionalization, jointly determine the threat formation. Given the fact that the most significant task for incumbent governments who have already overthrown authoritarian leader is the maintenance of contemporary rule (Huntington, 1991). Therefore, the governments will be more sensitive to any conflicts which may be involved into political arena at state level.In this sense, state responses will be more coercive.

The escalation of communal violence, however, about which what state concerns more, is collective action at state level. The likelihood of external intervention of communal violence is considered, serving as constraints for collective action at state level. If the likelihood of external intervention is higher, the threat evolution will be stronger. The significant difference in this mechanism lies in that both constraints (likelihood of external intervention) and impetuses (effectiveness of security forces) are considered in collective action at state level. Given the escalation of communal violence, the state responses at first stage (security forces) are proved to be less effective and then the transformation of concerns of threat perception from societal level to state level will be made. Therefore, the state responses will be applied in less coercive terms in the context of newly-born democracy, especially with international supervision or external pressure. The theoretical framework isoutlined in Figure 2.

4. Case Studies

4.1 Ethic cases: Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan

4.1.1 Back Ground

In West Kalimantan, there were two major episodes of communal violence, spontaneously overlapping the transitional moment, Suharto's fall. One was perpetuated by Dayaks against Madurese in 1996-1997 and the other was initiated by Malays and subsequent Malay-Dayak coalition against Madurese in 1999. I will compare these two episodes to examine the changes of communal violence, threat perception and state responses.

Two waves have been identified, including 30 December 1996 till 4 January 1997 and 29 January 1997 till second-half of February 1997. The trigger was a trivial scuffle between a group of Madurese youth and two young Dayaks over a girl. Rumors of the Dayaks' death, however,

enraged ethnicDamasks and they organized gathering at the police station. The first significant response was implemented by police with arrestment of perpetrators and management of meetings among community leaders. However, the impact of the response was not remarkable. The conflict was increasingly intensified, with over 1,000 houses destroyed till the end of the wave .Coercive actions were taken by military by 2 February but in a more strategic way. They decided not to be encircled into both conflicting ethnic groups and partly let go unchecked. During the attacks, the security forces focused more on evacuate refugees than containing the violence. Then the violence quickly escalated into the second wave due to the arrival of outside Dayaks driven by ethnic grievance. In response to the escalation, the state-sponsored peace ceremonies were brought about, with local leaders, army and police commanders, and ethnic elites attended. Then the violence was terminated temporarily.

The trigger of the second episode was the youth quarrel between Malays and Madurese over a motorbike theft on 17 January 1999. The outbreak of ethnic violence betweenMalays and Madurese in Sambas District was on 2 February 1999, attributing toMalay mobilization. A single organization formed in January 1999, Communication Forum of Malay Youth (FKPM), was responsible for organizing and arming youths to confront Madurese in pursuit of Malay dominance over the district. State responses were demonstrations from local police and formal discussions on Madurese Problem. The violence escalated when a Dayak was killed in March, following which was the engagement of Dayaks and formation of Malay-Dayak coalition. Although security forces attempted to check the violence, they mostly collaborated with FKPM for evacuation of Madurese. By May, the Madurese had been almost completely expelled from Sambas District .The segregation policy served as an end of the violence. In response to the violence, the provincial governments concentrated on humanitarian management with establishment of meetings at district and sub district level. Jakarta, on the other hand, formulated policy for allocation of resources for relocation, housing and fulfillment of basic requirements.

Dayak-Madurese and Malay-Madurese violence in West Kalimantan was mirrored in Central Kalimantan. Triggered in February 2001, four Madurese men were killed by a group of Daye's,anti-Madurese ethnic cleansing had already been developed by the Malay-led mobs in West Kalimantan .With the interpenetration of LMMDD-KT and state decentralization, the violence was regarded as "highly organized" by the police . The conflict had already escalated

past its peak by the time security forces arrived. Military commanders put themselves exclusively in escorting Madurese and the control over the armed mobs was applied to police. The police focused primarily on protecting Madurese who were trying to flee the violence rather than on stopping the rampaging crowds. The violence continued escalating, however, and expanded to nearby towns.The military and police were sent from Jakarta with inherent contradiction.The police tried to extract bidding while the military sabotaged the plan by offering patronage to local strongmen (McCarthy, 2007). The termination of the violence was combined with more through segregation policy formulated by Jakarta government on mass exodus of 90 percent of Madurese population. 4.1.2 Intra-case analysis: West Kalimantan

Despite the similarities between the two episodes, the similar trigger as fights between youth and the same victims as ethnic Madurese, the state responses significantly vary. First, the military was intensively deployed in first episode while absence in second episode. I argue that the difference relies in the external intervention of Dayaks, following which the military came. In the second episode, the violence was restrained in Sambas District without external intervention in line with ethnicity. Second, the escalation of violence in first episode ended with peace ceremonies while the escalation of second episode ended up with victim assistance. In terms of the impact of the policy, the employment of peace agreement was unsuccessful because of the upsurge of ethnic violence later in two years. The contents of peace ceremonies were prepared by military in advance without input from those involved in the violence, and the legitimacy of participants was even suspected in their respective community. The changes of security forces were illustrated in the second episode, with transformation of focus on conflicting groups to victims. Moreover, due to the weak commitment of military in first episode, the credibility of agencies at state level was declined. It is remarkable that Malays objected to the inclusion of "peace" in any conference in 1999 because the state's compromise of protection of Madurese had partly fallen into property bribes.

The findings in comparison of independent variable, communal violence, are as follows. First, Malays in the second episode could quote no history of ethnic cleavages with Madurese while the ethnic violence between Dayaks and Madurese had occurred before 1997. In this sense, the demands of conflicting groups are not monolithic. The 1997 ethnic violence concerned more about ethnic grievance rooted in local issues like land management and logging industry

(Klinken, 2008) while demands of 1999 ethnic violence was migration of the wealthier Madurese and pursuit of Malays domination in Sambas. Second, the level of institutionalization significantly differs. FKPM offered frame integration characterized by chauvinistic nationalism of Malay's domination and stable mobilization with support from well-connected local businessmen. Additionally, both of the episodes showed the likelihood of external intervention with one from the same ethnicity and the other different ethnicity (1997 ethnic violene: outside Dayaks; 1999 ethnic violence: Dayaks).

Existing explanation of the changes concerning instant transition in 1998, institution-oriented and interest-oriented, ascribe the transformation to power-sharing settlement. The end of military rule in 1998 is not synonymous to the alteration of political machinery (Klinken, 2007). The erosion of ethnic power-sharing pacts was still attributed to the decline of military responses (Davidson, 2008), at both societal level and state level. On the one hand, lack of confidence to previous conflict-resolution tool renders conflicting groups adopt a more obstinate position on political engagement, like the occupation of both district head and deputy of district head. On the other hand, the internal fraction between police and military also retards the response due to mutual buck-passing and even outbreak of fighting (HRW, 2006).

This theory does not object to this explanation, instead, it integrates both sides of society and state in temporal variation through inclusion of idea-based approach, threat perception. In response to the outbreak of ethnic violence, the main concerns for threat perception of state are at societal level, including demands of conflicting groups (anti-Madurese in 1997 and Malay domination in 1999)and level of group institutionalization (less institutionalized in 1997 and more institutionalized in 1999 under force of FKPM). In response to the escalation of ethnic violence, the main concerns for threat perception of state are at state level with more consideration of security forces based on the likelihood of external intervention of conflicting groups (Dayak-Dayak in 1997; Malay-Dayak in 1999).

4.2 Religious Cases: Ambon, Poso

4.2.1 Background

The trigger of Ambon religious violence was a scuffle between a Muslim youth and a Christian youth in January 1999, and soon developed into violence between Muslims and

Christians in provincial level and others from other parts of Indonesia. Wahid, the later president, perceived of the demands more politically as to replace all 38 top provincial officials with Muslims .Slightly different to the perception of executive, the parliament emphasized anti-migrant status due to the occupation of most jobs in bureaucracy by migrants. Meanwhile, the cleavage was also identified in security forces. Christians were more associated with the police while the military and Muslims created intimacy with each other (Klinken, 2007). Similar conditions shadowed in Jakarta politics with struggle between political parties. PDI-P backed Christians and PPP affirmed Muslim identity. The initial response was police warning and soldiers nearby stood tepidity no orders accepted on intervention in the violence. The escalation of violence, marked by the violence in Tobelo in late December 1999, the claim for a holy war (jihad) was raised among Muslims and quickly obtained support from national-level politicians and overseas Islamists. With subsequent introduction of automatic weaponry, more professional military training, and better institutionalized organization, the state responses changed. The central government initiated national peace conference between Christians and Muslims in February 2002 and brought out the Malino I peace agreement.

Poso, a district of Central Sulawesi, experienced Muslim-Christian violence triggered by a trivial knife fight between two religious youths in December 1998 .Conventional wisdom positioned the dynamics of Poso religious violence into five phases (Tajima, 2014; Klinken, 2007).In order to better understand state responses in this theoretical framework, I rearranged these phases and made the fourth phase, Poso civil war, as the most significant escalation. The demand of the conflicting groups was the district head election.The police initially managed the violence by urging the victim Muslims to establish defensive militias for themselves .Outside Islamic militias, marked by Laskar Mujahidin and Lascars Jihad, gradually participated in the violence against Muslims. With the escalation of the violence into civil war in late 2000, over 1,500 military personnel were dispatched to mitigate the violence, paralleled with the announcement of MalinoII agreement from national governments.

4.2.2 Inter-Case Comparison

Similarities between the two cases are mainly at societal level. First, demand of conflicting groups in both cases is local political position (civil recruitment). Second, both of

them enjoy similar resources of institutionalization. Religion, as a stable and widely-shared identity, helps frame integration. A notable fraction, based on frame integration, is the power balance between Christians and Muslims. Christians in Ambon was more integrated while inversion in Poso. The impact of the fraction, shown in mobilization, includes two approaches: state penetration and frame diffusion. State penetration is interpreted in the engagement of supportive political parties (PDI-P backed Christians and PPP supported Muslims) and establishment of informal intimacy with security forces (association in military-Muslim or police-Christian line). The arrival of outsiders is one of the impacts of frame diffusion.

Therefore, I will conduct an inter-case comparison in examination of the escalation of communal violence. Two remarkable differences are found. First, despite the implementation of peace agreement as the last resort of state in both cases, an enormous military deployment was exclusively attached to Malino II in Poso. Second, in Ambon, the external intervention of Muslims and the claim for jihad afterwards did not arouse expected coercive responses as that in Poso.

These two can be plausibly explained through this theoretical framework. The inclusion/exclusion of military, combined with Malino Accord, was due to threat perception of effectiveness of security forces which serves as impetus for collective action at state level. In Ambon, security forces are believed to play partisan roles. The army established informal intimacy with Muslim communities while police mobile brigades with Christian communities .Therefore, the violence was perceived under control of state apparatus with lower threat perception.

The more coercive state responses after external intervention in Poso can be attributed to threat perception of external intervention per se which is regarded as potential constraints for collective action at state level. The external intervention in Poso is to blame for its wider range. Muslim militias were not only absorbed from other regions in Indonesia but also rendered an extension to international level. It was interpreted as shadow of "Muslim terrorism", shown in New York Times. The replacement of "communal violence" with the term "terrorism", which is universally acknowledged as public enemy, indicates the stronger threat perception in Poso.

5. Comparative Analysis: Ethnic Cases and Religious Cases

The examination on variation of state responses to dynamics of communal violence above substantiated the theoretical framework. In this section, I will reexamine the causal mechanism among communal violence, threat perception and state responses. I conduct the following findings based on horizontal comparison of the categorical violence.

To begin with, it is noteworthy to examine the variation of state responses to ethnic violence and religious violence. Actors involved in responding ethnic violence were mainly security forces (military and police) and local elites where no conspicuous challenge towards state agencies. The strategies employed relied more on evacuation and assistance than quelling the violence on both side. Collective action at state level was unified. For one thing, they suggested that the effectiveness of their security forces was limited and they might not be able to contain ethnic violence in the future. For another, given the predictable and credible risk of checking the violence, concentration on victim assistance with non-interference of conflicting groups would be safer for state rule and they could also extract interest from protection through patronage. While in religious cases, actors involved were more complicated with the inclusion of political parties, executives, and parliaments. Strategies were stronger marked by clearer identification of the violence, the more extensive deployment of military and more diverse approaches from military operations to peace agreements. Collective action at state level was fragmented, suggesting more differentiated concerns to religious violence and more suspicion to effectiveness of their security forces.

In terms of communal violence, the examination over demand of conflicting groups, level of organizational institutionalization and the likelihood of external intervention will be highlighted. The demand of conflicting groups in ethnic violence was displacement of Madurese, based on ethnic grievance concerning historical hatred or economic discrepancy. While the demand of conflicting groups in religious line was civil recruitment, inflamed by religious grievance, and was more likely to be driven into desire for Islam state or Islam self-domination. The religious violence, more comprehensively entrenched into political arena, was more intended to threaten contemporary rule of incumbent government with upheaval. The level of institutionalization, marked by frame integration and organizational mobilization, differed as well. In Indonesia, religious organizations and political parties have huge memberships and a

long history while ethnic organizations are fewer in number and poorer in institutionalization. The organizational mobilization, on the other hand, was stronger in religious cases due to the wider and more militarized external intervention. Therefore, collective action at societal level was more unified in religious cases because of more integrated frames (religion/Islam), more institutionalized organization (political parties in religious line) and the likelihood of broader and more militarized external intervention (overseas Muslim militias).

I argue that threat perception is stronger concerning religious cases than that of ethnic cases. Ethnic violence, less unified in societal level, is associated with more unified collective action at state level. It illustrates that state is not driven to comprehensively involved into the response despite they have already enjoyed the capacity. The state responses are less coercive and deaths toll, compared with that of religious violence, was much lower. On the contrary, state actors were more likely to take stronger actions where Islam/religion was involved, in spite of level of collective action at state level was less unified while the societal collective action was more unified. Hence, the causal mechanism of communal violence, threat perception and state responses is justified.

6. Comparative Analysis: Separatist Cases

6.1 Background

The long-standing separatist movement in Aceh can be divided into three episodes. The first two, 1976-1979 and 1989-1998, were under Suharto's New Order. I will focus on the third renewed violence in post-Suharto Indonesia from 1998 to 2005. The trigger was the direct desire for independence from Indonesia and greater share of natural wealth. In response to the reoccurrence of this violence, several national peace agreements were offered by national governments. Broader autonomy was included, which was modeled on the same offer made to East Timor, with the right to implement sharia-inspired regulations/laws. However, GAM rejected this and the violence still escalated marked by the Bantaqiyah Massacre in 1999. Apart from the Special Autonomy Law passed in 2001 which allowed for considerable autonomy for Aceh and greater share of natural wealth, the central government finally decided to declare martial law in Aceh and to initiate a new counterinsurgency campaign called Operas' Terpadu (Integrated Operation) in 2003.

The separatist violence in Papua, triggered by similar target in 1999, aroused similar response of the Special Autonomy Law in 2001 as that in Aceh. However, with the escalation of violence marked by the occupation of camp in 2002, another two state responses were provided. The first was the intervention of Special Forces. The Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus) had entrenched interests in Papua, such as providing security for the Freeport mine, the involvement in illegal logging and so on. The ongoing role of secretive Special Forces should be noted. Besides, the state responses relied largely on local security forces (police and military), including the creation of a new army brigade. The military and police were expected to exercise the right of protecting national assets by stationing men.

6.2 Discussion

To confine the scope of my explanation, I will compare separatist cases through temporal variation. I suggest that there is continuity of state responses to separatist violence both in Suharto's New Order and post-Suharto Indonesia. National governments are involved in the policy formulation with the outcome of military operations and peace agreements. Separatist movement is long-standing and remains difficult for policy makers to deal with. This finding illustrates that the explanation of state responses do not make sense in separatist cases. The exogenous factor, the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004, is more pivotal in explanation of the long-standing difficulty but sudden easy frame. Therefore, the explanation is applied to communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia rather than separatist cases.

7.Conclusion

In this section, I will conclude my findings, illustrate the implications of my research and identify required future work.

First, I argue that state responses to the outbreak of communal violence depend on threat formation on collective action at societal level. Collective action at societal level, indicated by demands of conflicting groups and level of organizational institution, positively influence the level of threat formation.

Second, state responses to escalation of communal violence depend on threat evolution on collective action at state level. It is interpreted through constraints marked by the likelihood of eternal intervention, and impetus marked by the effectiveness of security forces.

Third, threat perception of religious violence is stronger than that of ethnic violence, paralleled with more state actors' involved, wider range of strategies and higher likelihood of coercive military deployment.

The implications of my research lie in two dimensions. In literature dimension, I respond to some gaps in conflict literature and threat perception literature. First, I have identified the temporal variation of state responses to dynamics of communal violence and provide a plausible explanation for the change with the inclusion of collective action perspective. Second, I have dynamically examined threat perception through vertical and horizontal comparison, and contributed to parameters and constituencies of threat perception. In practical dimension, this research enjoys significance for policy formulation of violence containment. Segregation policy, in line with relocation and assistance, can help contain ethnic violence. While peace agreements, with input of relevant factors involved in previous conflict, is conductive to appeasing religious violence.

Several aspects which are not highlighted in this research require future study. First, we have understood that there are different constituencies of threat perception, but was some concern overstated or understatedly perceived? Counter-factual analysis may be necessary and useful on this issue. Second, the scope of this study is communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia. Given there are other significant forms of violence, like separatist movements or electoral violence, how to generalize this theory and increase explanatory power remains to be studied.

References

Brown, G., Wilson, C., & Hadi, S. (2005). Overcoming violent conflict. Peace and development analysis in Maluku and North Maluku, United Nations Development Program, Jakarta.

Aragon, L. V. (2001). Communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: where people eat fish and fish eat people. Indonesia, 45-79.

Aspinall, E. (2007). The Construction of Grievance Natural Resources and Identity in a Separatist Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 950-972.

Barron, P., Diprose, R., Madden, D., Smith, C., & Woolcock, M. (2003). Do Participatory

Development Projects Help Villagers Manage Local Conflicts.Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, CPR Working Paper, (9).

Bertrand, J. (2004). Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia.Cambridge University Press.

Boudreau, V. (2009). Resisting dictatorship: Repression and protest in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, R. (1979). Threat perception in international crisis. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Davenport, C. (1995). Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. American Journal of Political Science, 683-713.

Davidson, J. S. (2009). From rebellion to riots: Collective violence on Indonesian Borneo. Nus Press.

Davidson, J. S. (2002). Violence and politics in West Kalimantan, Indonesia.University of Washington.

Davidson, J. S., &Kammen, D. (2002).Indonesia's unknown war and the lineages of violence in West Kalimantan. Indonesia, 53-87.

Erb, M., Faucher, C., &Sulistiyanto, P. (Eds.).(2013). Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Routledge.

Farnham, B. (2003). The theory of democratic peace and threat perception. International studies quarterly, 47(3), 395-415.

Goodwin, R., Willson, M., & Stanley, G. (2005).Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain. British Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 389-406.

Hefner, R. W. (Ed.). (2009). Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and

Democratization: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization. Princeton University Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985).Ethnic groups in conflict.University of California Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (2001).The deadly ethnic riot.Univ of California Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma press Human Rights Watch, the Violence in Ambon ICG, A fragile peace ICG, Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict ICG, Dividing Papua: How not to do it

Jervis, R. (2015). Perception and misperception in international politics.Princeton University Press.

Van Klinken, G. (2007). Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia: Small town wars (Vol. 6). Rout ledge.

Van Klinken, G. (2008). Blood, timber, and the state in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 49(1), 35-47.

Kivimäki, T. (2006).Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role of the International Community.

McCarthy, Meghan (2007). The Story of Charles Atlas, Strong Man. New York: A.A. Knopf

Patric Barron et al. (2014). How large Conflict Subside: Evidence from Indonesia. Indonesian Social Development Paper no. 18. The World Bank

Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 35(1), 27-47.

Schedler, A. (2013). The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism. Oxford University Press.

Schwarz, A., &Bymes, M. (1998). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the1990s. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 28(3).

Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (2009). Transnational Peace Building and Conflict: Lessons from Aceh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 24(2), 211-235.

Sidel, J. T. (2006). Riots, pogroms, jihad: religious violence in Indonesia. Cornell University Press.

Snyder, J. L. (2000). From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict (p. 37). New York: Norton.

Tajima, Y. (2014). The Institutional Origins of Communal Violence: Indonesia's Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press.

Tadjoeddin, M. Z., Suharyo, W. I., & Mishra, S. (2001). Regional disparity and vertical conflict in Indonesia. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 6(3), 283-304.

Varshney, A., Tadjoeddin, M. Z., &Pangaea, R. (2004). Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia, 1990-2003. UNSFIR.

Wilkinson, S. (Ed.). (2005). Religious politics and communal violence. Oxford University Press, USA.

Wulan, Y. C., Yasmi, Y., Purba, C., &Wallenberg, E. (2004).An analysis of forestry sector conflict in Indonesia 1997–2003 (No.CIFOR Governance Brief no. 1, p. 8p).CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.